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NOTES, COMMENTS and DIGESTS
CONSOLIDATION AND MERGER OF AIRLINES UNDER
SECTION 408 (b) OF THE C. A. A.
Petitioner, United Air Lines Transport Corporation, filed an application
with the Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to § 408 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, requesting a certificate of convenience and necessity for
merger or purchase of all the assets of Western Air Express Corporation.
After proper hearing, Special Trial Examiner, Roscoe Pound, recommended
approval of the petition. Exception was thereupon filed by the interveners,
T. W. A., and the minority shareholders committee of Western. After
reviewing the Examiner's report, the Civil Aeronautics Board refused issuance
of the certificate on the ground that the proposed merger would be inconsistent
with "public interest."' Alternatively, an application for interchange of flying
equipment on the airlines' connecting transcontinental route was approved, thus
2
eliminating passenger transfer at Salt Lake City.
The instant case raises two issues: (1. construction of the statute, (2.
application of the statute to the particular fact situation.
Section 408 (b) of the Act provides that the Board shall approve mergers
unless they find that such acquisition of control "will not be consistent with the
'3
public interest."
It would seem that this represents an express mandate for
the Board to grant all petitions unless found contrary to public interest. Hence,
in every case the burden of proof would rest on .the Board. The present case
represents no express ruling on this point, for petitioner undertook to establish
public benefit ;4 the Board and the Examiner differed as to what was proved.
Assuming that the burden of proof rests with the Board, the statute is not
clear as to the degree required; must the Board prove simply that no additional
benefit to public interest will accrue, or must they establish that the proposed
merger will be detrimental to public interest? Again, the ruling of the instant
1. In the Matter of the Application of United Air Lines Transport Corporation Docket No. 270; Board Order, Serial No. 558, June 19, 1940.

2. in the Matter of the Application of United Air Lines Transport Corporation, Docket No. 215 ;Board Order, Serial No. 557, June 19, 1940.
3. 49 U.S.C.A. § 488 (b), 52 Stat. 1001 (1938) "Any person seeking approval

of a consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of
control specified in subsection (a) of this section, shall Present an application to

the Authority, and thereupon the Authority shall notify the persons involved
in the consolidation, merger purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of
control, and other persons known to have a substantial interest in the proceed-

ing, of the time and place of a public hearing. Unless, after such hearing, the
Authority finds that the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating con-

tract, or acquisition of control will not be consistent with the public interest or
that the conditions of this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order, approve
such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of
control, upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable

and with such modifications as it may prescribe: Provided, That the Authority
shall not approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract,
or acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or

monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier
not a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control . . "
4. Supra Note 1 at 5: "United seeks to establish that the approval of the

application would advance the public interest by contending (1)
that the
transcontinental service between Los Angeles and points east of Salt Lake City on

United's route . . . would be materially improved, (2) that the unification of
properties and operations would result in greater efficiency and economy, and
(3) that local service would be better . . . than it is at present."
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case is dicta.1, However, the words, "will not be consistent with public interest" 6
seem to support the latter construction. Further, should the first construction
be adopted, this would in effect shift the burden of proof to the petitioner as in
every instance no other party could be relied on to allege hypothetical benefits
to the "public interest."
What the Board must prove in establishing detriment to public interest is
not left to speculation. The framers established in their "Declaration of
Policy," § 2,7 that "among other things" the "public interest" should be
determined by consideration of adequate development, economy and safety,
fair trade practices and the protection of such competition as necessary for the
benefit of all interests concerned. In the instant case, the Board was of the
opinion that sufficient detriment to the public interest existed to deny the
application.8
As the Board found such detriment existent, they concluded no necessity
existed to consider the first proviso of § 408 (b) which says that no merger
or lease shall be approved which would "result in creating a monopoly or
monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier
. . ."9 However, as such exclusion is questionable and as the proviso was both
considered and interpreted by the Board in the Interchange Opinion, it is worthy
of note. Apparently the position of both the Board and the Examiner was that
this monopoly proviso is a condition supplemental to the public interest criterion
(which in itself involves consideration of restraint of competition).' 0 Thus,
5. Supra note 1, at 4: "The application of United is to be approved providing the other conditions in section 408 are fulfilled, unless it is found that
the proposed acquisition of control and the subsequent merger or purchase of
assets will not be consistent with the public interest."
Supra note 1, at 26: We find that the factors opposed to the public interest
. . . outweigh the considerations urged in support thereof . . . therefore . . .
that approval of United's application in this case would not be consistent with
the public interest."
Supra note 2, at 11.
"Under the terms of section 408 (b) and 412 (b)
of the Act, two distinct Issues are presented for decision: (1) whether or not
the agreement is adverse to or inconsistent with the public interest . . . In
so far as the 'public interest' is concerned, the expressions 'adverse to' and
'not consistent with' have essentially the same meaning .
6. See supra, note 3.
7. 49 U.S.C.A. § 402, 52 Stat. 980 (1938) : "In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the Authority shall consider the
following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance
with the public convenience and necessity.
(a) the encouragement and development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and

domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service and of the

national defense;
(b) The regulation of air-transportation in such manner as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety
in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to
improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air
carriers ;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discrimination, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of
an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the forelgn
and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service and of.
the national defense.
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote Its
development and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.
8. See supra, note 5.
9. See supra, note 3.
10. Trial Examiner's Report at 11: "I conclude that, subject to the
proviso in § 408 as to monopoly with certain effects, the balance of public interest
in advancing air travel and making it as effective as possible as a means of
transporting passengers, mail and express is prescribed as the general policy to

be carried out by the Authority in all cases."

Supra note 1, at 26: "However, in view of our finding that the proposed
acquisition of control, and subsequent merger or purchase of assets, is incon-
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even if an application of X and Y lines for merger shows adequate consonance
with public interest, the Board still would be powerless to grant a certificate
of convenience and necessity, should such action create a monopoly. The
anomalous situation thus created is, that if X and Y lines are non-competing
monopolies at the time of the application, the proviso of § 408 (b) would seem
not to apply. Examiner Pound, who construed the monopoly proviso to apply
in the instant case, perceived this as one method of circumvention; said he:
".. . it is pretty clear that there is no actual competition between United and
Western.""1
Whether the Board correctly regarded the monopoly proviso of § 408 (b)
as a supplemental limitation depends largely upon the interpretation accorded.
Read literally, it would seem to prohibit all monopolies, for any monopoly is
in degree a restraint of competition, However the Board refused to accept
this definition of monopoly; they defined it instead "as a condition embodying a
particular degree of control."'1 2 Claimed advantage of this definition is that
the words immediately following "monopoly," "and thereby restrain competition," are thereby given meaning whereas they are otherwise repetitious. The
difficulty here lies in the fact that by redefining "monopoly," restraint of
competition likewise alters meaning and again becomes repetitious, though in a
different sense than priorly. Hence, not only are definitions foreign to the
statute invoked, but the canons of statutory interpretation are not aided.
An established canon of statutory construction makes mandatory an interpretation giving all parts of a statute consonance and purpose.1 3 If we refer
to the policy section of the Act, § 2, we find that § 2 (d) declares that
"competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air
transportation system .... " shall be maintained. 14 This is elastic; it does not
say that competition is to be maintained-rather, the board is to "consider" its
necessity. If effect be given this policy section, the proviso of § 408 (b) cannot
exclude monopolies absolutely. Further support for this position may be found
in the fact that § 414 of the Act relieves all parties under § 408 from the
operation of the antitrust laws. x5 If no monopolies were to be allowed, it would
be senseless to lift the ban. Hence, to give the whole Act accordance, the
proviso of § 408 (b) must be regarded as a particularization of § 2; therefore
the clause, "and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier,"
becomes explanatory rather than repetitious of its modifier, "monopoly."' 0
sistent with the public interest, it is necessary to decide this case on tile basis
of the proviso."
Supra note 2, at 11: "Under the terms of section 408 (b) and 412 (b) of
the Act, two distinct issues are presented for decision: (1) whether or not the
agreement is adverse to or inconsistent with the public interest, or will violate the
Act or any of the conditions of section 408 ; and (2) whether or not the agreement will result in creating a monopoly and thereby restrain competition or
jeopardize another air carrier."
11. Trial Examiner's Report at page 22.
12. Supra note 2, at 22 et. seq. The Board concludes "that restraint of
competition is a factor, in so far as the application of the proviso is concerned,
only if it results from that degree of control which the Authority decides constitutes a monopoly of air transportation."
13. Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Railroad v. Tennessee, 262 U. S.
318 (1922) ; Robinson v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 222 U. S. 506 (1911).
14. See supra, note 7.
15. 49 U.S.C.A. § 494, 52 Stat. 1004 (1938) : Any person affected by any
order made under sections 408 . . . shall be and Is hereby, relieved from the
operations of the "antitrust laws" . . . and of all other restraints and prohibitions
made by, or imposed under, authority of law, insofar as may be necessary
to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such
order.
16. An incidental problem of interpretation of § 408 (b)'s proviso is
possible. Does "jeopardize another air carrier" modify the predicate of the first
subordinate clause, "which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies."
or, do the two together constitute a single compound subordinate clause? If

362
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Is the proviso of § 408 (b) then, anything more than a mandate that the
Board give extraordinary consideration to the issue of monopoly and competition when considering the elements of public interest under § 408 (b) ? If
not, then the proviso of § 408 (b) is in no sense a supplemental condition to the
granting of a certificate of convenience and necessity.
It is doubtful if Congress ever intended the monopoly proviso to be
absolute. Section 408 (b) was taken in principle from the Interstate Commerce
Act, § 5,17 and was originally drafted by Commissioner Eastman of that
body.' 8 In fact, it has been asserted that the Commerce act was in reality
10
As found both in the Commerce Act and the
silently enacted into the C. A. A.
original draft of the McCarran and Lea bills, the proviso prohibited only those

monopolies that would "unduly restrain competition or unreasonably jeopardize
another air carrier . . . ,20 Senator Borah demanded the striking of the
italicized words on the ground that he did "not wish to connive at a still more
21
However, there is no indiliberal construction" of the 'Standard Oil case.
cation that Congress intended the Board to have any less power than the
22
Commerce Commission.
the latter, then jeopardy to another air carrier is a condition in addition to
monopoly.
There seems little doubt though that the jeopardy clause was
intended to be the second predicate of the second subordinate clause-all of which
Thus construed the proviso means that those
together modify "monopoly."
monopolies shall be prohibited which restrain competition or Jeopardize another
air carrier.
(1933) "...whenever the commission is of
17. 49 U.S.C.A. § 5 (1)
opinion, after hearing upon application of any carrier . . . that the division of
their traffic or earnings, to the extent Indicated by the commission, will be In
the interest of better service to the public, or economy in operation,' and will
not unduly restrain competition, the commission shdll have authority by order
to approve and authorize . . . such division of traffic or earnings . . . as shall
be found by the commission to be just and reasonable In the premises."
49 U.S.C.A. § 5 (4) (b) (1933) "Whenever a consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or acquisition of control Is proposed . . . If
after such hearing the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and
conditions and such modifications as It shall find to be just and reasonable, the
proposed consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or acquisition of control will be In harmony with and in furtherance of the plan for the
consolidation of railway properties established pursuant to paragraph (3),
and will promote the public interest, it may enter an order approving and
authorizing such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control, upon the terms and conditions and with the modifications
so found to be just and reasonable."
18. See 83 Congressional Record, page 6730.
19. See Rhyne, Civil Aeronautics Act Annotated, Preface pp. xv, xvI.
20. (1938) 9 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 317, 318.
21. See supra, note 18, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United
States 221 U. S. 1 (1910).
22. 83 Congressional Record, page 6732: Mr. Pope. Mr. President. I
should like to ask, what would be the effect of striking out the words "unduly"
and "unreasonable" on page 67? In other words, why were those words inserted
In the first place? Was there a reason for inserting them; and if so, what
would be the effect of striking them out?
Mr. McCar an. Mr. President, In my judgment, if the Senator addresses
his question to me, the effect would be that it would lessen what I choose to
term the flexibility of judgment. In other words, we are creating an authority
to deal with a great industry. We are giving to that authority very much
power and latitude, so that the industry may go forward and the public may be
served.
If we provide that they shall not do a thing "unduly" or "unreasonably,"
we inject into the law the equation of human Judgment as to what Is undue
and what Is unreasonable. If we take these words out, then we say that they
shall not do a certain thing. That is an analysis of It,as I see it.
Mr. Pope. Mr. President, that is the question In my mind. There Is an
authority for consolidation and merger, or for operating contracts.
Mr. McCarran. Yes.
Mr. Pope. It seems that any consolidations and merger In the ordinary
case-

Mr. McCarran. Would be .denied.
Mr. Pope. 'Would have to be denied.
Mr. McCarran. That Is correct.
Mr. Pope. If we leave out those words. So that In a consolidation, merger,
or operating contract, acquisition of control would not be possible with those
words left out. That may be a desirable thing, but I merely wished to get It
clear In my mind.
Mr. McCarran. I shall answer the Senator's question, and I am glad the
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That public interest may demand the creation of a monopoly in some
instances scarcely admits of a doubt. Conceptually, monopolies are closely
allied with public utilities; "the notion of a public utility is made up of two
' 23
ideas: (a) the idea of monopoly and (b) the idea of common necessity."
It is the necessity of monopoly in a public utility which distinguishes it from
other forms of competitive enterprise and leads the State to confer upon such
industries legal monopolies. As distinguished from other forms of enterprise
where competition is maintained through equality of bargaining power, the
State then undertakes to control the utility's economic relations. 24 That this
is done in the "public interest" has been established doctrine since Munn v.
llliois.25

Classification of the air transport industry as a public utility is not.
difficult.
If not completely a utility, at least it possesses many of the
characteristics thereof.2 6 Much significance may be ascribed to the fact that
Congress rot only indicated the degree of public interest involved, but created
Senator from Idaho is going to assist me, because I know that his mind and
mine run along the same lines with reference to this subject.
If we strike out those words, we make it hard and fast that they shall not
do a certain thing; but they will do It, because their judgment will operate no
matter what law we enact. Then, when they do it, we have to come back to the
law and say, "You did it wrongfully" or "You did it rightfully" and then some
court will have to pass on it finally.
Mr. Borah. Mr. President, the suggestion of my colleague that a merger
necessarily destroys competition, in my judgment is not well sustained. There
may be a merger or there may be a combination, and it may not have any
effect on the question of competition whatever. It all depends upon the facts
In each case. What I desire to see accomplished is the preservation of the
opportunity of competition. When we say to the commission that these lines
shall not do a thing "unduly" or "unreasonably" it is very different from
saying that they shall not do it. It gives too much room for unlimited construetlon . . . "
Cf. Rhyne, supra note 19 at 144: "The provision regulating consolidation,
merger and acquisition of control is taken in principle from the Interstate
Commerce Act, but the Authority is much more limited in its discretion . . . "
Rhyne, supra note 19 at 147: "The antitrust exemption provision invoked
much debate by Congress, but the same provisions are included in the Interstate Commerce Act. Under the Air Mail Act of 1934, Solicitor General Crowley
was severely criticized for allowing merger of competing lines, and Senators
McCarran and Pope in the debate on the Bill declared that in the ordinary case
any consolidation or merger 'would be denied'."
Apparently Mr. Rhyne overlooked part of the record printed above.
Senators McCarran and Pope were merely seeking clarification of the issue
and Senator Borah is quite clearly correcting their impression as to denial in
his concluding remarks.
Note also Senator McCarran's remark that the
Board will grant monopolies In any event; compare with the Board's statement,
supra note 12.
23. 18 Encyclopaedia Britannica 744; 12 Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences
674.
24. Supra, note 23: "The power of the State will be used either to regulate
industries so as to restore equality of bargaining power by maintaining competition and controlling competitive practices, or used to promote the inherent trend
toward monopolistic organization by conferring upon such industries legal
monopolies and then controlling their economic relations . . . "
25. 94 U. S. 113, 126 (1876) : "When private property is 'affected with
a public interest, it ceases to be Juris privati only.' This was said by Lord
Chief Justice Hale more than two hundred years ago in his treatise De Portibus
Mari8 1 Harg. Law Tracts 78 . . . Property does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the
community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants the public an interest
In the use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw
his grant by discontinuing the use; but so long as he maintains the use, he
must submit to the control."
26. Supra note 23: A "tendency toward monopoly, whether the result of
a competitive struggle or brought about by legislation is a fundamental characteristic of public utility business."
It is the duty of a public utility "To render reasonably adequate service
to all who apply . . . up to the limit of its capacity with capacity being defined
as the limit of profitableness."
It may be said that the legal notion of public utility is that of a fixed concept with a changing content.
"The industries at any time recognized as
'clothed with a public interest' are not necessarily the industries which may
legally be classified as public utilities at another time."
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over the industry a body endowed with greater power than accorded any
prior independent regulatory agency. The simple explanation for this lies
in the fact that prior experience had demonstrated that without uniform and
equitable regulation, investment of private capital was discouraged, the
business of air commerce lagged and lack of synchronized cooperation between
employer and employee left labor in this highly skilled service unprotected and
27
improperly compensated.
As "not only is commercial aerial transport to play a vital part in our
national development but likewise it is to become a forceful agency for national
defense," 2 8 it would indeed be regretable if a restricted interpretation of power
or lack of foresight should again retard the aviation industry.
Whether the certificate should have been granted in the instant case is a
fact upon which capable minds have already differed. As indicated before,
the Board in its order at least, gave disjointed consideration to the issue of
monopoly, their conclusion being that the west coast predominance requested
would not be best suited to encourage and develop air transportation "properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense" nor
"be in accordance with the best interests of local business in that territory and
would not serve to maintain and encourage competition to the extent necessary
to assure the development of a properly balanced system of air transportation
in that section of the country."29 Obviously the Board stressed local needs;
the Examiner emphasized broader national needs and was quick to point out
that the power of the Board is sufficient to prevent local abuses.8 0 This would
seem more consonant with the theory of public utility regulation.
It is worthy to note in passing that the interchange agreement approved in
lieu of the merger by the Board grants to petitioner much the same rights and
privileges as requested by them three years ago of the Post Office Department.
The petition was then denied on the ground that it would make Western a
"mere shell" and that through plane service was not necessary. 8 1

DIGESTS
INSURANCE-Interpretation of Participation in Aviation Clause with
Relation to Free Passenger in Glider.-[Pennsylvania]
Insured met his death as the result of a crash while operating a pleasure
glider. The device was cable-operated, usually rising to less than two hundred
feet and then being automatically released, was propelled by air currents for a
short distance with the guidance of the occupant. On this particular day, the
glider was caught in a strong wind, having ascended higher than usual, and
27. See Senator MeCarran's foreword to Rhyne, Civil Aeronautics Act
Annotated (1939); Gorrel, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Democratic
Government (1938) 9 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 703, 708: " . . . the need for
legislation springs not at all from a need to protect the public from exploitation
but rather a need to assure to the Industry itself opportunity for vigorous
growth. The familiar reasons for regulation of other industries in the past,
notably the need to assure that the public be protected from exorbitant rates
and discriminatory practices would not in this case have prompted a solitary
vote in Congress.'
28. McCarran, supra note 27.
29. Supra note 1, at 25.
30. Trial Examiner's Report at 20 "The argument about 'dominance' of
a region has lost much of its force under the present day regime of administrative
regulation of public utilities . . . the broad powers of the Authority under § 205
(a) are equal to preventing such things."
31. (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 635, 651.
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DIGESTS

insured lost control of the craft while trying to avoid collision with a grove of
trees; the craft crashed. Action by the wife-beneficiary of two accident policies
to recover death benefits.
The defense of the insurance company was that deceased at the time of
death was participating in aviation or aeronautics within the meaning of the
excepting clause of the policies, which provide: "This insurance shall not
cover . . . injuries, fatal or non-fatal, sustained while participating in aviation
or aeronautics except as a fare paying passenger." The lower court decided
in favor of defendant's contention that operation of the glider under the
circumstances of the case was within the excepting clause of the policies. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
The court places the determination upon the definition of the words "aviation
or aeronautics" as used in the policy. They define aviation as "the art or
practice of operating heavier than air aircraft," and "aeronautics" as "the
science that treats of the operation of aircraft ; or the art or science of operating
aircraft." From these definitions the court concludes that a glider is "a type
of airplane not equipped with a motor" and that the term "aeronautics is a
broad one and embraces the whole art of navigating the air."
The contention of plaintiff that the provision was not intended to refer
to short flights taken as a form of sport where the person ascends less than
two hundred feet and remains aloft but a few minutes is answered thusly by
the court: 1) there is no reasonable basis for such distinction, as, unfortunately
two hundred feet was sufficient to cause insured's death, 2) the policies regarded
aviation and aeronautics in general term without any qualification as to the
commercial or non-commercial character of the participation. Spychala v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 87 P.L.J. 543, aff. 13 A. (2d) 32 (1940)
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. -Temporary
Employment Outside
of State.-[New Hampshire]
Plaintiff's intestate was employed by X Company as an automobile mechanic
in New Hampshire. By agreement between X Company and Y Air Service
of the same state, deceased occasionally worked for the latter as an airplane
mechanic, for which he was licensed. While in their employ he was struck by
a plane propeller and killed in the state of Maine.
X Air Service denied liability under the workmen's compensation act because,
1) deceased was not in their employ, 2) the accident happened outside of New
Hampshire. The indemnitor of X Air Service denied liability on the ground
that deceased had not been considered in computation of the premium as the
sums for his services were paid to X Company rather than to deceased directly.
The lower court dismissed the petition as to X Air Service and entered a decree
against the indemnitor. On appeal, plaintiff's exceptions to dismissal of X
Air Service was sustained; the remainder of the decree was affirmed.
As to the question of agency, the court said:
"The servant of a general employer who is hired out to another for a
particular service becomes ordinarily the servant of the latter during
the performance of that service. Gagnon v. Dana, 69 N. H. 264. And
this principle has full application to the master and servant relation
under compensation laws Parsons v. Company, 115 Conn. 143, 150 . . .
In determining the relation between the workman and the person to
whom he is hired out, the decisive inquiry is whether that person has the
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right to control the servant and direct the details of his work. If the
servant is subject to such direction and control, he is for the time being
the servant of the temporary employer. Manock v. Company, 86 N. H.
104, 106 . . . "
The court found such control to exist.
Secondly the court found that the clause, "outside the state" in the Act,
referred not to the place of the accident but was intended as designating a class
of workmen regularly employed in another state. Hence temporary employment
outside of the state would not preclude recovery. Such a determination also
automatically disposed of indemnitor's non-liability plea for the policy provided payment "to any person entitled thereto under the Workmen's Compensation Law." The fact that deceased had not been included in computation of
premiums constituted no defense, for his true status could have been ascertained.
Bisson v. Winnipcsaukee Air Service Inc. et al., 13 A. (2d) 821 (1940).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.-Employees Engaged in Actual Flying Not Within State Act.-[ Washington]
Petition by the state of Washington on the relation of Northwest Airlines
for writ of mandamus to compel the director of the department of labor and
industries to recognize those of relator's employees actually engaged in flying as
within the scope of the state workmen's compensation act. All of these
employees are to some extent engaged in interstate commerce. The writ was
denied.
The court reasoned that as the Act was originally passed in 1911, a time
when air transportation was a novelty, persons engaged aviation could not
have been included. Though the legislature had amended the Act at various
times since then, the legislature had never seen fit to include air transport
employees. The court denied that such employees could be included under
"Airplane (manufacturing)," or "motor delivery." State e.r rel. Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Hoover, 93 P. (2d) 346 (1939).
CONTRACTS-Liquidated Damages Computed From Date of Delivery.
[Federal]
Plaintiff submitted a bid to the Soil Conservation Service, United States
Department of Agriculture, for the making of certain aerial photographs.
The invitation under which he bid provided that the successful bidder was to
have his plane at the airport ten days after official notification to proceed;
that the flying was to be computed fourteen days after the date of award and
that the prints were to be delivered within fourteen days after completion of the
flying. Liquidated damages for failure of performance was set at twenty
dollars per day.
Plaintiff was notified of acceptance on Sept. 21, by a telegram giving him
authority to go ahead with the work. The formal written contract was not
completed until Nov. 26 and the last materials required under the contract were
delivered to the defendant on Dec. 9. The defendant deducted from the contract
price, $1,020 as liquidated damages, claiming that Sept. 21 was the (late of the
contract. Held, that the date of delivery of the formal contract fixes the time
when the contract went into effect. Verdict for the plaintiff, $1,160.
The court quoted 17 C.J.S. 88, sec. 359 that:
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"In the case of a written contract, the time of its delivery unless a
different intent appears is ordinarily deemed to be the time when the
contract becomes binding. A date on the written instrument is generally
not conclusive, and if delivery is shown to have been at a different time,
that time is deemed to be the date of inception of the contract unless an
intention to other effect is otherwise shown."
The court expressly refused to place its decision on the fact that an agent
of the defendant had stated in a letter of Oct. 18 that no contract existed as of
that date. Also the court distinguished American Smelting and Refining Co.
v. United States, 259 U. S. 75 (1921) from the instant case on the ground
that as all prior negotiations are merged in the final contract, the first agreement of the instant case was superseded by the formal valid contract now sued
upon, whereas in the Smelting case, plaintiff sought to have both contracts held
invalid and to recover on quantum meruit. John B. Holmberg v. The United
States, U. S. Court of Claims, June 3, 1940. C. C. H. Aviation Law Service,
4015.
PROCEDURE-Negligence Suit Involving Scientific Evidence.
[Manitoba]
The suit in this instance grows out of the same accident as that considered
in Gater v. Wings, 47 M. R. 281; (1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 414.
Defendant's plane crashed near Lac du Bonnet, April 10, 1936, caused by the
breaking of a propeller shortly after the plane took off. Plaintiff of the prior
case was denied recovery.
Suit is brought in this case by another injured passenger on the basis of
negligence in failing to properly inspect and test the propeller. The Referee
ordered the case to be tried by jury. On appeal the court held that as the case
involved introduction of scientific evidence, it came within the scope of decisions
declaring such cases are better tried by a judge alone than with a jury; K. B.
Act, sec. 65 (4). Nystedt v. Wings Limited, Kings Bench, Manitoba, Feb. 26,
1940, C. C. H. Aviation Law Service 1231.

